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In a recent article, Werndl and Frigg discuss the relationship between the
Boltzmannian and Gibbsian framework of statistical mechanics, addressing
in particular the question when equilibrium values calculated in both
frameworks agree. In this paper, I address conceptual confusions that could
arise from their discussion, concerning in particular the authors’ use of
“Boltzmann equilibrium”. I also clarify the status of the Khinchin condition
for the equivalence of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian, and show that it follows
under the assumptions proposed by Werndl and Frigg from standard
arguments in probability theory.
1 Boltzmann vs. Gibbs
In a recent paper, Charlotte Werndl and Roman Frigg (2017) discuss the relationship
between the Boltzmannian and Gibbsian framework of statistical mechanics,
addressing in particular the question, if and when the two formulations yield equivalent
predictions for equilibrium values of macroscopic observables defined in terms of
appropriate macro-variables.
In the Boltzmannian framework, the macro-variables take (approximately) constant
values on the equilibrium region of phase space which are thus revealed by a suitable
measurement on a system in equilibrium (a system, that is, whose actual micro-state is
in the equilibrium region). The role of the stationary phase space measure is to
establish that it is very likely to find the system in an equilibrium state. In the
Gibbsian framework, equilibrium is a property of an ensemble, represented by a
stationary distribution ρ on phase space Γ, and it is often (though maybe somewhat
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carelessly) said that the prediction for a measurement of a macro-variable f on an
individual ensemble system is given by the phase average
〈f〉 =
∫
Γ
f(x)ρ(x) dx , (1)
where x ∈ Γ is the phase space variable. This quantity is also called the ensemble
average or expectation value of f .
There are many situations in which the Gibbsian phase average agrees – within
appropriate error bounds – with the Boltzmannian equilibrium value. Werndl and
Frigg mention a criterion which they call the “Khinchin condition” and which they
characterize briefly as the phase function having “small dispersion for systems with a
large number of constituents”. Indeed, in less technical terms, a sufficiently small
dispersion of the macro-variable means precisely that typical values (the Boltzmann
equilibrium value) are close to the average value (the Gibbsian equilibrium value).
Another way to formulate the Khninchin condition – now from a Boltzmannian
perspective – is to say that there exists a unique Boltzmann equilibrium whose
corresponding macro-region exhausts almost the entire phase space volume. Formally:
µρ (Γeq) =
∫
Γ
1 ({f(x) ∈ (ξ −∆ξ, ξ +∆ξ)}) ρ(x) dx = 1− ǫ, (2)
where ∆ξ is very small compared to ξ and ǫ is very small compared to 1 (and 1(·) is
the characteristic function). For then, the macro-variable f takes an (approximately)
constant value – the Boltzmannian equilibrium value ξ ±∆ξ – on a set of measure
close to 1 – the Boltzmannian equilibrium region Γeq. Hence, the phase average (1) will
be close to the Boltzmannian equilibrium value, provided f is somewhat well-behaved
and its values don’t suddenly “explode” outside the equilibrium region. Rigorously:
|〈f〉 − (1− ǫ)ξ| ≤
∫
Γeq
|f(x)− ξ| ρ(x) dx+
∫
Γ\Γeq
|f(x)|ρ(x) dx
≤ (1− ǫ)∆ξ + ǫ sup
x∈Γ\Γeq
|f(x)|, (3)
and thus 〈f〉 ≈ ξ if ǫ supx∈Γ\Γeq|f(x)| ≪ |ξ|, i.e. unless the non-equilibrium values of f
are many orders of magnitude larger than the equilibrium value.
It is important to emphasize that (unless one considers a thermodynamic limit) “the
Boltzmannian equilibrium value” refers in general to a small range of values of f . This
kind of coarse-graining is both essential for probabilistic estimates and physically
called for, since the relevant measurements have limited accuracy. For Werndl and
Frigg, in contrast, each single value of the macro-variable f defines a different
“macro-state”, implying that, for them, even the slightest variation in the respective
physical quantity – pressure, density, energy etc. – leads to a system being “out of
equilibrium”. What the authors call the “Boltzmann equilibrum” is thus not the
equilibrium as defined by Boltzmann or used in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics,
and it is unfortunate, since miselading, that they refer to it by the same name. For our
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futher discussion, we will thus refer to it as the “Werndl-Frigg equilibrium” instead.
The existence of a dominant Boltzmann equilibrium (in the sense of Boltzmann) is
in fact the generic case in statistical mechanics, giving rise to the claim that
Boltzmann and Gibbs make (in general) equivalent predictions for systems in the
respective equilibria. If one agrees that the Boltzmannian formulation is the more
fundamental one, this also explains why Gibbsian phase averaging yields (in general)
accurate predictions for individual measurements.
On the other hand, there are famous and well-studied cases in which the Khinchin
condition (2) doesn’t hold. For instance, in the two-dimensional Ising model without
external field, it makes sense to speak of two Boltzmann equilibria below the critical
temperature, corresponding to a positive or negative magnetization, respectively. The
Gibbsian distribution ρ is, however, symmetric under a flip of all spins, hence yielding
an average magnetization of zero. There is nothing inconsistent or mysterious about
this fact, as long as one keeps in mind that the Gibbsian value refers, in the first place,
to an ensemble average. In particular, in statistical mechanics, one does not try to
draw interesting conclusions about the Ising model from such phase averages. Instead,
one usually studies so-called phase transitions at the critical temperature by fixing
either +1 or −1 boundary conditions (referring to the polarization of spins at the edge
of the lattice) thus implicitly picking one of the two magnetization states.
2 Boltzmann vs. Werndl and Frigg
In their paper, Werndl and Frigg mention the magnetization in the Ising model only
briefly, but present instead other examples for which they claim a disagreement
between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian equilibrium values. One such example is based on
the “baker’s gas”, a mathematical model for the ideal gas that the authors have used
in various publications to argue that the Boltzmann equilibrium fails to be dominant,
i.e. exhaust a majority of the phase space volume as stated in equation (2). To this
end, the authors partition the one-particle phase space (corresponding to the unit
square in the baker’s model) into k cells and claim that the macro-state corresponding
to the Boltzmann equilibrium is the “uniform distribution” for which each cells
contains exactly N
k
particles. It is then easy to see that while the phase space volume
associated with this uniform distribution is greater than the phase space volume
associated with any other particular arrangement of particles over the cells, it will not
exhaust a majority of phase space volume for large N . In the present paper, the
authors exploit this fact – amounting to an apparent violation of the Khinchin
condition (2) – by introducing an artificial macro-variable, weighing the previously
defined “macro-regions” in such a way that the Gibbsian phase average differs
significantly from the value associated with the uniform distribution.
However, as emphasized above, the authors’ reference to the “Boltzmann
equilibrium” is a misnomer, since they use a notion of equilibrium that does not
correspond to the concept introduced by Boltzmann and used in Boltzmannian
statistical mechanics (thereby repeating the arguments of Lavis (2005) already
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criticised by Lazarovici and Reichert (2015)). Exact uniform distributions, where each
cell contains exactly N
k
particles, are very special configurations, their measure actually
goes to zero for large N . But configurations for which the density of particles in each
cells differs only slightly from 1
k
are macroscopically indistinguishable and coarse-grain
to the same macro-state in Boltzmann’s sense. Otherwise, we would have to say, for
instance, that a gas is “out of equilibrium” if the left-hand-side of the volume contains
even a single particle more than the right-hand-side.
Compare this with Boltzmann’s discussions of the Maxwellian velocity distribution
as the equilibrium distribution of an ideal gas. Here, Boltzmann was very explicit
about the fact that “for a finite number of molecules, the Maxwell distribution will not
hold exactly but only to a good approximation.” (Boltzmann, 1896, translation D.L.)
In the case of the baker’s model, the dominant Boltzmann equilibrium with respect
to the considered uniform measure contains all configurations for which the relative
number of particles in each cell is within 1
k
± 1√
N
(I am neglecting a k-dependent
constant that would yield somewhat better bounds). Since 1√
N
is a tiny number for
macroscopic N , corresponding to density fluctuations of less than one tenth of a
billionth of a percent, these configurations look macroscopically uniform and constitute
the relevant equilibrium state. The Khinchin condition (2) is thus satisfied and the
Boltzmannian and Gibbsian equilibrium values will be equivalent for any sensible
macro-variable as specified above.
3 Law of large numbers vs. EET
By the same token, all other examples presented by Werndl and Frigg may show a
disagreement between the Gibbsian equilibrium and their own, but shed no light on
the relation with the real Boltzmann equilibrium. Nevertheless, the authors go on to
conclude that it is “[a]n important task of the foundations of SM [statistical mechanics]
... to classify under which conditions the two frameworks lead to the same results and
under which conditions they do not” (p. 1300) and present a “new theorem specifying
a set of conditions” under which “Boltzmannian” and Gibbsian equilibrium values
coincide. I quote their result in full:
Equilibrium Equivalence Theorem (EET): Suppose that the system
(X, Tt, µX) is composed of N ≥ 1 constituents. That is, the state x ∈ X is
given by the N coordinates x = (x1, ..., xN); X = X1 ×X2 . . .×XN , where
Xi = Xoc for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N (Xoc is the one-constituent space). Let µX be
the product measure µX1 × µX2 . . .× µXN , where µXi = µXoc is the measure
on Xoc. Suppose that an observable κ is defined on the one-particle space
Xoc and takes the values κ1, . . . , κk with equal probability 1/k, k ≤ N .
Suppose that the macro-variable K is the sum of the one-component
observable, i.e. K(x) =
∑N
i=1 κ(xi). Then the value corresponding to the
largest macro-region as well as the value obtained by phase space averaging
is N
k
(κ1 + κ2 + . . . κk).
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This theorem tries to identify the Werndl-Frigg equilibrium value with the Gibbs
average. It does not relate to the Boltzmann equilibrium. That is because the “largest
macro-region” of Werndl and Frigg refers to the set on which the macro-variable takes
exactly the average value, and this is, again, in contrast to the Boltzmannian
framework, in which a small range of (for all practical purposes indistinguishable)
values coarse-grains to the same macro-state.
It should be noted, however, that part of the conditions specified by Werndl and
Frigg are sufficient (though by no means necessary) for the equivalence of Gibbsian and
Boltzmannian equilibrium values. In fact, under these conditions, the equivalence is a
standard exercise in statistical mechanics, based on the law of large numbers (LLN) –
the fundamental theorem of probability theory. The LLN states that, for a family of
independent and identically distributed random variables:
µ
({
x :
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
κ(xi)− 1
k
(κ1 + κ2 + . . .+ κk)
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
})
≥ 1− σ
2
ǫ2N
, (4)
for any ǫ > 0, where σ2 is the variance of κ. For the macro-variable K(x) =
∑N
i=1 κ(xi)
then, which is extensive and growing with N , we can set ǫ = N−δ for δ ∈ [0, 1
2
] so that,
in terms of K (and writing K := N
k
(κ1 + κ2 + . . .+ κk) as a “phase average”), the LLN
estimate becomes
µ
({
x :
∣∣∣∣K(x)−
∫
K(x′) dµ(x′)
∣∣∣∣ < N1−δ
})
≥ 1− σ
2
N1−2δ
. (5)
Note that the bound N1−δ is small compared to K, which is of order N , i.e. it is the
relative deviation
∣∣∣K−K
K
∣∣∣ . N1−δ
N
= N−δ that becomes vanishingly small for large
particle numbers. In particular, for a macroscopic system, we have N ∼ 1024 (from
Avogadro’s constant), and setting δ = 1
3
, we can conclude that K deviates from K by
less than one millionth of a percent on a set of measure (approximately) 0, 999999.1
Summing up in less technical terms, the weak law of large numbers states precisely
that for large N (which is the relevant case in statistical mechanics), phase space is
dominated by an equilibrium region, on which the value of the macro-variable K is
very close to the expectation value (= phase average). And this is precisely the
empirical equivalence of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian equilibrium values. The LLN also
yields immediately the Khinchin condition, both in the sense of small dispersion
(which is actually how the LLN is usually proven) and in the form of equation (2) (to
be compared with (5)).
The LLN holds, in fact, under much more general assumptions than those of the
EET. In the form of eq. (5), the result holds for any sum of uncorrelated and
identically distributed random variables with finite variance. This is to say that
neither the uniform distribution, nor the discreteness of the random variables is
1A tacit assumption, generally made, is that the variance σ2 of the one-constituent variables κi is of
order 1. If σ is extremely large, or somehow chosen to increase with N , the LLN may fail to provide
relevant estimates, though such cases seem unphysical.
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required, and they don’t even have to be defined on a one-constituent space. The
conditions are nonetheless very strong and hardly apply to anything but idealized
models. In fact, when Werndl and Frigg write:
The crucial assumptions of the theorem are (i) that the macro-variable is a
sum of the observable on the constituent space and (ii) that the
macro-variable on the constituent space corresponds to a partition with
cells of equal probability. (p. 16)
they overlook the truly critical assumption in both their theorem and the LLN. While
(i) is often justified, and the “equal probability” in (ii) unnecessary when one argues
with the LLN, the crucial and very strong assumption is the statistical independence of
the constituent variables (their joint distribution factorizes!), which doesn’t hold, in
most relevant cases, due to interactions or conserved quantities. (It is precisely this
loss of statistical independence that becomes significant in the Ising below the critical
temperature.) Controlling correlations – or justifying in some other way a “law of large
numbers” – is in fact the key issue in many of the hard problems of statistical
mechanics.
I want to emphasize again that while the LLN applies immediately under their
stated assumptions, the theorem proven by Werndl and Frigg is not a LLN statement,
because the authors have a different notion of “Boltzmann equilibrium” in mind. The
LLN, as much of statistical mechanics, is about estimates. Werndl and Frigg don’t do
estimates. Instead, in their paper, the Werndl-Frigg equilibrium value and its equality
to the phase average is supposed to be exact. This is why, in addition to considering
standard conditions for the LLN, the authors assume a particularly simple and
symmetric distribution of the macro-variable for which the average coincides with the
most likely value. The EET is then a simple exercise in combinatorics. It’s physical
relevance, however, is questionable to say the least. For one, the measure of what the
authors call the “largest macro-region”, i.e. set on which K takes precisely the value
N
k
(κ1 + κ2 + . . .+ κk), actually goes to zero for large N . Interpreting this measure
probabilistically, it is thus very unlikely for a system to be in this Werndl-Frigg
equilibrium. Second, while the macro-variable considered by Werndl and Frigg is
discrete, different values can be very close for large N . Hence, many different
“macro-states” in the sense of Werndl and Frigg will be empirically indistinguishable,
given the limited resolution of measurements on macroscopic systems. This is a crucial
difference between macro-states in the sense of Werndl and Frigg and macro-states in
the sense of Boltzmann. Finally, it should be stressed that the relevant notion of
equivalance for Boltzmannian and Gibbsian equilibrium predictions can only be
empirical equivalance, i.e. that the respective values agree to a sufficiently good
approximation.
The law of large numbers is in fact the paradigm that one should have in mind when
one thinks about the Boltzmann equilibrium: there is a certain range of typical values
for the relevant quantities. And the larger the particle number N , the more weight
(phase space measure or probability, if you wish,) is concentrated on an ever smaller
range of values around the mean.
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It is also a standard result in probability theory that the variance (= dispersion
squared) for a sum of independent random variables (as considered by Werndl and
Frigg) is additive. This is to say, in particular, that typical fluctuations are of the order√
N and we will not have a dominant equilibrium region if the coarse-graining into
macro-states is finer than that. This is a mathematical fact, not a foundational issue.
(Note that partitioning the one-constituent space into cells is only a coarse-graining on
the microscopic scale (order 1 for an extensive variable) and thus not sufficient for a
macroscopic coarse-graining.)
To be clear: a “macro-variable”, qua mathematical object, is usually some nice
function of the microscopic variables – think for instance of the energy H(q, p) as a
function of the particles’ positions and momenta in a canonical ensemble. But such a
variable is in general too fine-grained to consider all its different values as
macroscopically distinct. There is thus not a one-to-one correspondence between the
possible values of the macro-variable and Boltzmannian macro-states. Boltzmannian
macro-states are supposed to be observationally distinguishable by relevant means.
It should also be noted that while the Boltzmannian equilibrium value is thus
necessarily “unsharp”, the Gibbsian equilibrium value, if identified with the phase
average (1), is a definite real number by definition. It would be a mistake, however, to
read this as an “infinitely precise” prediction of the Gibbsian theory. Instead, one can
for instance compute the ensemble variance
(∆f)2 :=
∫
(f(x)− 〈f〉)2ρ(x) dx (6)
and identify the Gibbsian prediction, to be compared with the Boltzmannian one, with
〈f〉 ±∆f .
4 Conclusion
In sum, I arrive at the following conclusions about the paper of Werndl and Frigg and
their proposed “Ensemble Equivalence Theorem”:
1. Contrary to what the authors announce in their paper, their theorem doesn’t
provide any new conditions for the agreement of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian
equilibrium values. They have instead stated conditions (plus some unnecessary ones)
that are standard for the LLN from which the Khinchin condition readily follows.
2. The authors’ suggestion that “we need other conditions next to the Khinchin
condition” seems ill-motivated to begin with. They present examples in which what
they identify as the “Boltzmann equilibrium” fails to be dominant – so that the
Khinchin condition (2) is not satisfied – but those are also examples in which they find
the associated equilibrium value to disagree with the Gibbsian one. In fact, a good
case can be made that the Khinchin condition – in the sense of “uniqueness and
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dominance of the Boltzmann equilibrium” – is not only sufficient2 but also necessary
for the empirical equivalence of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian equilibrium values. (For
otherwise, we have either no Boltzmann equilibrium – and thus no Boltzmann
equilibrium value – or multiple Boltzmann equilibria, so that the Gibbsian phase
average will correspond to an average of the Boltzmann equilibrium values rather than
any one in particular). However, instead of arguing this point in greater detail, a more
important remark is maybe the following: If the Khinchin condition doesn’t hold, it
means that there’s a high probability of finding macro-values that differ significantly
from the Gibbsian phase average, so that the phase average, as a prediction for
individual measurements, is highly dubious in the first place.3
3. Werndl and Frigg have written a whole series of papers (2015a,b, 2017) attacking
the premise of a dominant Boltzmann equilibrium and addressing the problems – like
the non-equivalance of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian equilibrium values – that ensue.
However, a reader not well-trained in statistical mechanics could hardly tell from their
discussions that the foundational problems they choose to work on arise merely from
their own definition of “macro-states” and “Boltzmann equilibrium” that does not
correspond to the way in which physicists, since Boltzmann, have actually argued.
Since the authors generally fail to consider an appropriate coarse-graining of the
microscopic state space (as suggested both by physical considerations and elementary
results in probability theory) their counterexamples to the existence of a dominant
Werndl-Frigg equilibrium have no relevance for the Boltzmannian framework. No
Boltzmannian – least of all Boltzmann himself – every claimed that one could partition
phase space in any arbitrary matter and end up with a dominant equilibrium state.
In general, I am skeptical of this ad absurdum approach to the foundations of
statistical mechanics – constructing artificial counterexamples that create artificial
problems. In my opinion, it misses the point of the discipline, which is not an
“axiomatic theory” but an effective framework for the description of complex systems
that requires some degree of pragmatism and good physical sense. A crucial difference
is that in an axiomatic theory, any counterexample can point to foundational issues,
while in statistical mechanics, such counterexamples point merely to inadequate use.
2Together with an appropriate bound on the variation of the macro-variable as specified after equation
(3).
3It is common misconception that one measures “ergodic time-averages”. This is wrong since ergodic
time-scales are much too long, see Goldstein (2001).
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